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INTRODUCTION
The proper weight to be given the medical opinion of a disability clai-

mant's treating physician has presented a significant point of contention in
various legal settings. The subject bristles with complexity as it bisects evidentiary and broader social policy concerns.
Historically, American courts have not favored the application of rules of
weight in the evaluation of evidence, 3 on the view that they are antithetical to
1. J.D. University of Notre Dame, LL. M. University of Florida.
2. The Columbus School of Law at The Catholic University of America, Washington,
D.C. The authors would like to thank Mark D. DeBofsky for suggesting this topic as an area
for potential scholarship; they also express their gratitude to Dr. Roy F. Harmon, Jr., Dr. Rodney Poling, Dr. Tony Smith, Dr. Carol Broadway, and Dr. Mark Seego for insights into their
respective practice areas.
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the role of the jury. 4 This bias against rules of weight reveals itself in modern
evidence law as well in the "all-or-nothing" character of evidence rules.5
From this perspective, questions of admissibility present issues for a judge to
6
decide; the task of evaluating evidence goes to the jury.
By contrast, rules of weight work to "structure a comparable hierarchy of
evidentiary sources."' 7 As such, they are rightly understood as intruding on the
discretion of the fact finder,8 in that they grade the reliability of specific types
of evidence. Examples of arguments for or application of a treating physician
rule are frequently found in the administrative law setting, which has proven
more receptive to rules of weight.9
I
One of the more significant examples is the rule favoring the testimony
of treating physicians in Social Security disability cases.' 0 By regulation, " the
Social Security Administration regards treating physicians' opinions as providing a "detailed, longitudinal picture" of impairment inaccessible from other
sources, such as objective medical findings standing alone.
Even in the administrative law setting, however, rules of weight have not
found unequivocal acceptance.' 2 Significantly, though often resorting to Administrative law analogies in Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) cases, the Supreme Court in Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord
rejected the treating physician rule in judicial review of disability claim denials
under ERISA.' 3 As will be addressed in the discussion of that holding, infra,
the Supreme Court's rejection of the treating physician rule in ERISA cases
does not imply that district courts must disregard the superior probative value
of treating physicians' opinions when appropriate.
The article will develop this premise through analysis of a series of federal district court decisions that have credited the assessments of treating physi3. TERENCE ANDERSON, DAVID SCHUM & WIIAWAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE
226 et. seq. (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2005) (1991).
4. Charles L. Barzun, Rules of Weigh, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957, 1959-60 (2008).
5. According to Barzun, "[m]odern evidence law tends to be an all-or-nothing affair.
Most rules of evidence are admissibility rules that tell judges simply whether or not a
given piece of evidence may be viewed by the factfinder." Id. at 1958.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1959.
8. For example, substantive rules of law (where outcomes are determined "as a matter of
law"), legal presumptions (where inferences are encouraged from circumstantial evidence), rules
of corroboration (requiring corroboration of certain forms of testimony) and judicial comment
(permitting judges to give their opinion to the jury about evidence), all can be viewed as impinging on the province of the jury.
9. Id. at 1960-61, 1975--76.
10. In disability benefit cases, regulations require that the administrative law judge accord
more weight to the testimony of the treating physician than to that of other experts in adjudicating a disability benefits claim. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (2007).
11. Id.
12. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 370 (1998).
13. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 830-31 (2003).
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cians over those of other reviewing physicians. Distinguishing Nord, these
courts have accorded more relative value to treating physician opinions in
cases where psychiatric or mental conditions are in issue.
This article argues that these decisions can be reconciled with Nord. At
the same time, this article submits that a frequently proffered rationale for
doing so raises analytical problems. A distinction described in terms of objective versus subjective clinical diagnoses fails to provide a sufficient warrant for
14
crediting the opinions of treating physicians over reviewing physicians.
A more defensible explanation can be offered based upon the superior
forensic vantage point of examining physicians in certain contexts. When
viewed from this perspective, the probative force of an opinion by an examining physician may be justifiably preferred over a reviewing physician when
assessment of symptoms requires personal observation. A further advantage
of this analysis lies in its potential extension beyond psychiatric conditions
when warranted, for example, as in instances of co-morbidity. In the end,
what is known as the treating physician rule has become de facto an "examining physician" preference, or factor.
Further, since Nord, the Supreme Court has decided Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn,15 in which it held the payment of benefits by an entity that
both pays and decides claims created a conflict of interest. In such cases, the
evaluative tool suggested here can help the court in its determination that
assessment of disability was not biased, arbitrary, or capricious.
I. THE TREATING PHYSICIAN RULE AS A RULE OF WEIGHT

The "weight" assigned to a datum of evidence may be defined as the
probative force of an evidentiary fact. It is a contingent variable that varies in
significance and in proportion to its tendency to prove the proposition for
which it is offered. 16
When formulated as a rule, however, weight is fixed to a class of evidence as a form of guidance for the fact finder. A rule of weight grades a
class of evidence by indicating the extent to which the evidence (if credible)
will result in a correct finding on the factual issue to which the evidence
17
speaks.
Rules of weight, like other evidentiary rules; such as those governing
admissibility of evidence and presumptions, serve to channel the permissible
14. In fact, the objective-subjective distinction, infra section III.A., can be criticized as a
rule of weight that serves as proxy for the now-discredited treating physician rule.
15. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2008).
16. Relevance, credibility, and weight have been described as three essential characteristics
of an evidential datum necessary to evaluate the relationship between the evidence and a hypothesis. An assessment of the probative force or "weight" of evidence may serve as a sort of
natural language abbreviation for the probabilistic connection between a factual premise and an
inference from that premise. ANDERSON, SCHUM & TWINING, supra note 2, at 229.
17. Barzun, supra note 3, at 1985, 1992.
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inferences of the fact finder. In each case, the justification for the evidentiary
rules lies in piesumed warrants of reliability based upon general experience in
drawing factual inferences. Unlike rules of admissibility, however, rules of
weight exhibit a nuanced aspect wherein the fact finder examines the evidence
8
in question but with what is effectively a comment on its relative worth.
The treating physician rule may be described as a rule of weight in that it
holds the opinions of treating physicians of superior probative force to those
of non-treating physicians. For historical reasons, Anglo-American evidence
law does not offer many examples of rules of weight. 19 Moreover, the notion
of the treating physician rule as a rule of weight implies a rigid formalism that
can be misleading.
A. Rules of Weight in the Rationalist Tradition of Evidence
The rules comprising the law of evidence presuppose a number of philosophical positions that have collectively been described as part of a "rationalist
tradition. ' '20 The rationalist tradition implies moral realism in its goal of obtaining truth through rational means. It comprehends the purpose of evidence
and civil procedure as aiding the discovery of objective facts so that substantive law may be correctly applied, and this in service of the paramount goal of
"the rectitude of decision."'21
The historical development of this perspective requires an appreciation
of the rationalistic orientation of the Enlightenment period in which it arose.22
The underlying presumption of the rational competence of the individual led
to a natural prejudice against rules of evidence that would exclude evidence
(or weigh its probative force). 23 First articulated in Jeremy Bentham's philosophical work in eighteenth century England, 24 this view found robust expression in American jurisprudence in the person of John Wigmore. In his treatise, Wigmore states:
When evidential data are once admitted by the judge and there is a
sufficiency of them to entitle the case to go to the jury, their individual and total weight or probative value is for the decision of the jury.
This signifies, first, that there are no rules of law to bind them on the

18.
19.

See id. at 1959.
See ANDERSON, supra note 3.

20. WILJAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE at 14 (Widenfield & Nicolson 1985).
21. Barzun, spra note 3, at 1966.
22. TWINING, supra note 20, at 1-4.
23. Barzun, supra note 3, at 1959.
24. See, e.g., 1 JERFMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OFJUDICIAL EVIDENCE (Fred B. Rothman &
Co. 1995) (1827).

161

Weighing Medicaljudgments

subject..., and, second, that the judge's own view of the weight of the
evidence is not to control the jury. 25
Rules of admissibility became the central concern of the law of evidence with
26
questions of weight left to the province of the trier of fact.
B. The Treating Physician Rule in the Agency Setting
In view of the foregoing, the view that treating physicians' opinions are
given special weight in some adjudicatory settings might seem anomalous.
This is especially so in light of a marked trend away from deference to professional standards over the past so many decades.
In administrative law proceedings, however, the concerns for the province of the jury in the rationalist tradition have no place. In fact, the growth
of the administrative state and, concomitantly, the popularity of alternative
dispute resolution, have witnessed incursions into the domain of judges and
27
jurors alike.
Furthermore, recent scholarship has noted a shift in concern for the
"rectitude of decision" in favor of greater concern for finality and efficiency. 28
Rules of weight offer advantages in expedient assimilation of evidence (and
29
some would argue greater accuracy).
While the foregoing observations may serve to explain how rules of
weight have found greater acceptance in the agency setting, the treating physician rule has not been consistently applied. 3° In fact, when the rule has been
applied, its intended use may have been as a means of introducing judicial
discretion in cases where judicial review was otherwise sharply circumscribed
31
by a deferential standard of review.
The uneven application of rules preferring the opinions of treating physicians may be understood as a consequence of a devalued view of professional opinion. The treating physician rule derives from a line of cases, traced
back to at least 1977, that assigned a "substantially greater weight" to the opinion of the treating physician in matters of impairment. 32 The historic defe-

25.

9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE

§ 2551 (Little Brown and Company 1981). Wigmore goes

on to caution that this does "not signify that the judge may not comment upon the general weight
of the evidence, or of particular parts of it, to assist the jury in reaching their conclusion." Id.
26. Barzun, supra note 3, at 1958.
27. See id.at 1977.
ANDERSON, SCHUM & TWINING, supra note 2, at 84.
Barzun, supra note 3, at 1986.
Nord, 538 U.S. at 830 n.3.
See Rachel Schneider, A Role for the Courts: Treating Physidan Eidence in Sodal Securiy
Disabikoy Determinations, 3 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 391(1996)
32. Id. at 376; see also Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781, 785-76 (7th Cir. 1977). Prior to
Allen, a line of cases state much the same argument for deference to treating physicians. See
Mefford v. Gardner, 383 F.2d 748, 761 (6th Cir. 1967); Selig v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 594,
601-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Tritt v. Richardson, 320 F. Supp. 871, 873 (W.D. Va. 1970).

28.
29.
30.
31.
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rence of the courts to medical opinion has been put down to a variety of factors, including:
(1)fAjlack of understanding of the knowledge and practice of medicine, which creates a judicial fear of destroying the physician-patient
relationship; (2) a belief shared with society at large that physicians
know what is best for their patients; (3) a belief that physicians already tell patients all that patients need to know and (4) [a] reluctance
33
to interfere with the application of an esoteric body of knowledge.

The differentiation between "professions" and "trades" is another reason for judicial deference to medical opinions. This distinction stems from a
common regard for the professions and for their special cache of knowledge.
According to social historian Paul Starr, "expertise alone was [historically]
insufficient [to obtain the status of "profession"] unless accompanied by a
'service rather than profit orientation.' Only then could the occupation obtain
the social and legal privileges associated with the professions. This fidelity to
the customer distinguishe[d] a profession from a trade." 34 Commensurate
with the respect afforded "professions" were the customs to which they subscribed. As a consequence, the special knowledge of what was "best" practice
in a particular profession was given a somewhat wider berth in the tort context, but none greater than in the case of the medical profession. There, "rea35
sonableness" was set not objectively, but by custom.

However, as Philfip G. Peters has written,
[J]udicial deference to physician customs is eroding. Gradually, quietly
and relentlessly, state courts are withdrawing this legal privilege....
The slow but steady judicial abandonment of deference to medical
custom began in earnest in the 1970s, continued in the 1980s and retained its vitality through the 1990s. Showing no signs of exhaustion,
this movement could eventually become the majority position. Furthermore, many of the states that theoretically continue to defer to
custom actually apply the accustom-based standard of care in a way
36
that operates very much like a reasonable physician standard.

33. Gerald F. Tietz, Informed Consent in the Presciption Drug Context: The Special Case, 61
WASH. L. REv. 367, 376 (1986). Tietz's article sets out a general history of the deference, and
notes that the courts are reluctant to "impose legal standards that [might] pose unique and
difficult questions regarding medical practice." Id.
34. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 81-92 (1982).
35. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTs § 32, at 189 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984) ("the medical profession ...[is given] the privilege ...emphatically denied to other
groups, of setting their own legal standards of conduct, merely by adopting their own practices).
Arguably, the treatment of medical custom as evidence worthy of more weight than evidence of
what is the "best practice" in the field is another rule of weight, albeit one that the courts have
been displacing in favor of a reasonable physician standard.
36. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Maracice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 163, 164 (2000).
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Peters' article explains the unusual subsidiary doctrines 37 that the customary
medical practice rule spawned, and states that twelve states, as of the turn of
the millennium, had rejected the deference to medical custom standard, 38 or
had taken steps toward had taken steps towards phrasing the standard in
39
terms of the "reasonable physician."
Notable in the Nord decision is a candid (if not cynical) assessment of
treating physicians' opinions consistent with this cultural trend. The Court
explains its rejection of a rule of weight on the view that, just as physicians
employed by managed care entities may have "incentives" to make a finding
of "not disabled," so a treating physician may have an incentive to find the
opposite. This questioning of physician motives reveals a business oriented
assessment of professional opinion quite at odds with the historical view.
The following section will set forth the rationale behind the Supreme
Court's rejection of the treating physician rule in ERISA disability cases. In
this analysis, the objective will be to discern what preference, if any, treating
physicians' opinions have under the holding in Nord. Following that discussion, the argument that psychiatric and mental diseases are an instance of such
a preference will be reviewed with particular attention to the objectivesubjective principle enunciated in those cases.
II.REJECTION OF THE TREATING PHYSICIAN RULE IN ERISA CLAIMS
ADJUDICATION

As noted above, the Supreme Court in Nord rejected the treating physician rule in the context of private disability plans. A brief overview of the
rationale of that ruling will provide the background necessary to analyze cases
distinguishing this opinion.
Black & Decker sponsored an ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan that provided benefits for eligible employees suffering from a disability. Although Black & Decker funded claims and served as the plan administrator, it engaged Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) to render
initial recommendations on benefit claims. Under the terms of the plan, disa37. Id. at 166-67. These doctrines include the requirement of medical testimony to educate the jury on customs in the field; a preclusion of liability when there is more than one
school of thought as to best practice; the importance of local norms of practice; an insulation
of reasonable treatments that have bad results; the requirement that physicians with unique
information
"use it regardless of customary norms"; allowing patient consent to noncustomary treatments when customary treatments fail; allowing patients to opt-out of conventional treatments; allowing plaintiffs' verdicts "despite the absence of expert testimony and
despite evidence that the physician complies with customary practice when there is a matter of
"common knowledge"; and "endless refinements of the phrasing of the standard of care." Id.
38. Id. at 172.
39. Id. at 180; see also Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the '%Ezpers.
From D~erence to
Abdication Under the ProfrssionalJudgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992) (criticizing professional judgment deference in committing procedures and expansion of use of that deference on
the whole).
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bility determinations were to be made by the plan administrator "'based on
suitable medical evidence and a review of the Participant's employment history that the [plan administrator] deems satisfactory in its sole and absolute discretion.' ' 4° Disability was defined as 'the complete inability... of a Partici' 41
pant to engage in his regular occupation with the Employer." '
Nord, a participant in the plan, applied for disability. MedLife denied
Nord's application, whereupon Nord proceeded through several levels of
further consideration and appeal. The issue eventually developed into a dispute based upon a difference of medical opinion.
Nord's treating physicians concluded that he suffered from a degenerative disc disease and chronic pain that rendered him unable to work. MetLife
referred Nord to a neurologist for an independent examination, however, and
that physician reached a different conclusion. Though the claims administrator's neurologist agreed that Nord suffered from a degenerative disc disease
and chronic pain, he concluded that, aided by pain medication, Nord could
perform sedentary work. MetLife recommended that Nord's claim be denied
and Black & Decker accepted this recommendation.
Nord ultimately filed suit against the plan, wherein he challenged the
benefit denial in a claim for benefits under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court applied an abuse of discretion standard of review based upon a
grant of authority in the plan document. 42 On cross motions for summary
judgment, the district court ruled for the plan. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
Nord challenged the district court's decision allowing the plan to accept the
reviewing physician's opinion over that of his treating physicians.
The case arrived at the Ninth Circuit at a time when the federal courts
were struggling with the significance of benefit administrators that operated
under a conflict of interest. 43 This historical setting adds an additional layer of
complexity for those seeking to apprehend what the Ninth Circuit intended by
its invocation of the treating physician rule.
In Regula v. Delta Family-CareDisabiliy Survivorship Plan, the Ninth Circuit had previously required greater scrutiny of decisions by administrators
that both funded and paid claims. If an apparent conflict of interest could be
shown to have affected the administrator's decision, review would be de novo
rather than for an abuse of discretion.
At this point, the standard of review decision intersected with the treating physician rule's applicability. Under Regula, rejection of the opinions of
40. Nord, 538 at 826 (quoting Nord v. Black & Decker Disability Plan, 296 F.3d 823, 826
n.1 (9th Cir. 2002)) (alteration in original).
41. Id. at 825-26 (quoting Nord, 296 F.3d at 826 n.2).
42. See Nord, 296 F.3d at 828 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 115 (1989)).
43. The Supreme Court had previously observed that conflicts of interest constituted a
factor to be considered upon judicial review of benefit denials. See Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
44. 266 F.3d 1130, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001).
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the beneficiary's treating physicians could establish conflict where the rejection was not "sufficiently supported by the record."
Following its holding in Regula, the Ninth Circuit in Nord approached the
dispute in medical opinion with a keen eye to the potential conflict of interest
of the plan administrator. The Court observed that:
Thus, the long-term treating physicians and Black & Decker's independent (but one-time) clinical examiner disagreed. The same clinical
materials were available to both. In such a circumstance, under the
treating physician rule, the plan administrator can reject the conclusions of the treating physicians only if the administrator "gives 'spefor doing so that are based on substantial evicific, legitimate reasons
45
dence in the record.
Under this test for bias, the plan administrator's neglect of the treating
physicians' opinions both altered the standard of review to de novo and resolved the ultimate issue inasmuch as the only evidence opposing Nord's
claim was the sole opinion of the reviewing physician.
The only evidence advanced by Black & Decker to dispute the evidence of Nord's disability is Dr. Mitri's opinion that Nord is capable
of performing sedentary work. A scintilla of evidence or evidence
that is not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of
material fact.... We conclude that the lone opinion of Dr. Mitri, the
doctor hired by Black & Decker, could not reasonably overcome all
the other evidence demonstrating that Nord is disabled. Dr. Mitri's
opinion is overwhelmed by substantial evidence in the record, including the opinions of three treating physicians that Nord's condition
rendered him unable to meet the physical requirements of his posi46
tion as a Material Planner.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's incorporation of the treating physician rule into
the ERISA claims adjudication process arose as an element in ascertaining the
proper standard of review. The decision held particular significance as it
stood in opposition to that of other circuit courts of appeal. For example, the
Fourth Circuit had declined to adopt the treating physician rule as applied in
Social Security disability cases in an ERISA claim for benefits case, Elliott v.
47
Sara Lee Corp.
45.

Nord,296 F.3d at 831 (quoting Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595,

600 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995))).

46.

Id. at 832 (citations omitted)

47.

190 F.3d 601, 606 (4th Cir. 1999). The Seventh Circuit recounted the varying opinions

on the issue in Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914 (7th Cir.
2003), statingThe courts are divided on whether the presumption applies to benefits determinations
by administrators of ERISA plans. Compare Nord v. Black & Decker Disability Plan,
granted, 123 S.Ct. 817 (2003); Darland v. Fortis
296 F.3d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
Benefits Ins. Co., 317 F.3d 516, 532-33 (6th Cit. 2003); Jackson v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 303 F.3d 884, 888 (8th Cir. 2002); Skretvedt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 268 F.3d 167, 184 (3d Cir. 2001), and Regula v. Delta Family-Care Disability Sur-
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This variance in opinions gave rise to a Supreme Court grant of certiorari
to resolve the conflict in the circuits. Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court
held that plan administrators are not obliged to accord special deference to
the opinions of treating physicians. Though ERISA and the Secretary of La48
bor's regulations under the Act require "full and fair" assessment of claims,
the Court held that this mandate did not require plan administrators to credit
the opinions of treating physicians over other evidence relevant to the claimant's medical condition.
In rejecting the treating physician rule, the Court stated:
As compared to consultants retained by a plan, it may be true that
treating physicians, as a rule, "have a greater opportunity to know and
observe the patient as an individual." . . . [Tlhe assumption that the
opinions of a treating physician warrant greater credit than the opinions of plan consultants may make scant sense when, for example,
the relationship between the claimant and the treating physician has
been of short duration, or when a specialist engaged by the plan has
49
expertise the treating physician lacks.
50
Nord thus established that, unlike Social Security disability proceedings,
ERISA claims adjudicators need give no special weight to treating physician
opinions. Plan administrators "may not arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant's
reliable evidence, including the opinions of a treating physician." 51 On the
other hand, courts may not require administrators to accord special weight to
the opinions of a claimant's physician or require explanation when they prefer
52
reliable evidence over a treating physician's evaluation.
III.

DISTINGUISHING Now) IN THE CONTEXT OF PSYCHIATRIC
EVALUATIONS

The Supreme Court rejected the application of the treating physician rule
to ERISA claims adjudications for reasons largely unrelated to accuracy of the
vivorship Plan, 266 F.3d 1130, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001), with Connors v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 127, 135 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2001); Elliott v. Sara Lee Corp., 190
F.3d 601, 607-08 (4th Cir. 1999), and Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966
F.2d 1011, 1016 (5th Cir. 1992).
48. See 29 U.S.C § 1133 (2006); 29 C.F.R § 2560.503-1 (2002).
49. Nord, 538 U.S. at 1251.
50. The Court distinguished the purpose of Social Security proceedings from that of private disability plans: "By accepting and codifying a treating physician rule, the Commissioner
sought to serve that need. Along with other regulations, the treating physician rule works to
foster uniformity and regularity in Social Security benefits determinations made in the first
instance by a corps of administrative law judges .... In contrast to the obligatory, nationwide
Social Security program, "[niothing in ERISA requires employers to establish employee benefits
plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of benefits employers must provide if they choose
to have such a plan." Nord, 538, at 833.
51. Id. at 834.
52. Id.
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claims decision. On the whole, the Court based its conclusions on broad rules
of statutory interpretation and agency deference.
For example, the court observed that:
1. ERISA does not provide that plan administrators must show special deference to the opinions of treating physicians.
2. The Secretary of Labor had not prescribed any regulations adopting a treating physician rule as had the Social Security Commissioner;
and
3. Important differences exist between the publicly funded Social Security disability program and benefit administration of private em53
ployer plans under ERISA.
While the issue of accuracy in outcomes did find some reference in the
opinion, the Court opined the matter was inappropriate for judicial resolution:
The question whether a treating physician rule would "increase the
accuracy of disability determinations" under ERISA plans, as the
Ninth Circuit believed it would. .. , moreover, seems to us one the
Legislature or superintending administrative agency is best positioned
54
to address.
The Court did, however, take the occasion to comment upon the issue as
a theoretical matter. While conceding the issue may be of an "empirical nature" that lay beyond the ken of the courts, the opinion nonetheless reflected
skepticism that a rule of routine deference would contribute to accuracy in
55
determinations.
Thus, the Nord holding left treating physician opinions in no better posture than those of reviewing physicians, having no "special weight" and imposing no "discrete burden of explanation" when opposed.56 In fact, treating
physicians' opinions may be subordinated to those of reviewing physicians
inasmuch as the standard of review may only require that the plan administra57
tor not arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant's reliable evidence.
A. The Psychiatric/Physical Divide
Several courts have distinguished Nord in the context of a psychiatric
evaluation on the view that an opinion based on personal examination is inherently more reliable. This conclusion rests on the premises that (1) psychiatric
disease is revealed through subjective symptoms; and (2) personal observation

53.
54.

Id. at 829-33
Id. at 832

55.

Nord, 538 U.S. at 832.

56.
57.

Id. at 834
Id.
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and interaction with the patient are required to evaluate these symptoms. 5 8
The reasoning in these cases draws on a substantial body of opinion favoring
treating physicians' opinions where psychiatric symptoms are at issue. 5 9 The
distinction has provided a means by which courts can reintroduce a rule of
weight to the proceeding, thereby wresting away from the Nord decision some
amount of deference to treating physicians.
One rationale upon which these courts base their decisions, making a
distinction for treating physicians in psychiatric disability matters--as opposed
to those involved in physical disability situations--is based on what the courts
term subjective/objective symptoms. For example, one district court opined
that "[i]n the context of a psychiatric disability determination, it is arbitrary
and capricious to rely on the opinion of a non-treating, non-examining doctor
because the inherent subjectivity of a psychiatric diagnosis requires the physician rendering the diagnosis to personally observe the claimant." 60
The distinction thus articulated does not comport with the prevailing
views of physicians in medical practice. 61 There, clear-cut differentiations between subjective and objective symptoms finds little basis in diagnostic assessments. Instead, the psychiatric and physical aspects of pain are viewed
more in the way of points on a continuum rather than sides of a dichotomy.
There are subjective aspects to physical ailments, as well as physical manifestations of psychiatric ailments.
The idea that "therapeutic" dialogue comprises the standard treatment in
psychiatric medicine, derived by means of a patient's relation of his subjective
feelings, is in fact something of a dated, romantic holdover from Freudian
stereotypes in which analysts query patients on couches. 62 As the neuros-

58. See, e.g., Morse v. Coming Inc. Pension Plan for Hourly Employees, No. 05-CV-6318,
2007 WL 610628, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2007); Westphal v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 05CV-6120, 2006 WL 1720380, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June 21, 2006).
59. These opinions somewhat set themselves against the aforementioned trend away from
the "deference to custom" rule, which until recently had been the standard in the medical malpractice field. See supra section I.B.
60. Wespha, 2006 WL 1720380, at *4.
61. The distinction also raises the possibility of a false legal distinction. For example,
tremors may be caused either by disease, such as Parkinson's or Huntington's, or by the manifestation of generalized anxiety or panic disorder. The Parkinson's disease patient, suffering
from a physical malady, will likely suffer from depression as well, and the typical symptom of
the disease-tremors-which can be debilitating and incapacitating-is as likely to be associated with one cause as the other. That a psychiatrist treating physician's diagnosis of debilitating tremors could receive deference under the law, as opposed to an internist treating physician
making a similar diagnosis, is a matter of consequence that leaves the court system open to a
potential abuse; such diagnoses, if properly couched in psychiatric terms, could receive preferential treatment in ERISA cases to those that have no psychiatric aspect.
62. Freud, a neurologist, attempted to approach neuroses in a psychological framework,
and thereby greatly influenced the way that such maladies were treated and understood by the
public. See Smith Ely Jeffrey, M.D., Sigmund Freud and Psycbiahy: A Par/ialAppraisal,45:3 AM. J.
Soc. 326 (1939).
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ciences have advanced, and with the advent of drugs such as Thorozine in
1954, as well as MAO inhibitors in the early 1950s, the treatment of mental
health problems became increasingly driven by approaches unrelated to psychoanalysis. 63 Then, in 1980, a standardization of diagnostic protocols in the
psychiatric fields appeared in the form of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric Association. 64 The work, now in its fourth edition, refined both the criteria for diagnosing different mental disturbances and that for proscribing treatment. The
manual provides a scientific, objective means by which to judge a psychiatric
condition. 65 Thus, the idea that objective data is more within the purview of
"physical" medicine than psychiatric, and that as a result, physical diagnoses, is
not entirely the case. Today, psychiatric medicine relies on objective data as
well as subjective, as does physical medicine.
In addition to the false dichotomy upon which such objective/subjective
data distinctions rest is what modern studies have found with regard to the
relationship between pain and mental stress, a mind-body continuum that a
variety of clinical studies has established. A recent article on this matter states:
Depression and pain share biological pathways and neurotransmitters,
which has implications for the treatment of both concurrently. A
model that incorporated assessment and treatment for depression and
pain simultaneously is necessary for improved outcomes.. .A growing
body of literature has focused on the interaction between depression
and pain symptoms. This interaction has been labeled by some authors as the depression-pain syndrome or depression-pain dyad, implying that the conditions often coexist, respond to similar treat-

63. Interview by Roy F. Harmon, Jr., M.D. with Rodney Poling, M.D., in Columbia, Tennessee (Aug. 16, 2008) at Line 312 [hereinafter Poling Interview] (on file with author). "Thorozine" is the generic name for Chloropromozine, a common sedative used in the treatment of
schizophrenia, among other things. "MAO" Inhibitors stands for "Monoamine oxidase inhibitors," a group of medications used to treat depression. PHYsIcIAN's DESK REFERENCE
MEDICAL DICTIONARY, (Baltimore: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2000).
64.

AMEICAN PsYCI-ATRIC AssOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF

MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM1.
65. In fact, today, psychiatrists are as likely to conduct standard patient interviews, perform physical examinations, and proscribe medications to treat psychological ailments as they
are to employ psychoanalysis in their work. Like any other physician, psychiatrists conduct
clinical interviews, probing for the manifestation of patient's problems in ways identical to the
clinical interviews of general practitioners or pediatricians. Psychiatric symptoms may stem
from physical bases-such as stroke, tumors, infectious diseases, stimulant addiction, etc.-and
psychiatrists routinely order CT scans, MRIs, and other lab work to determine the causesagain, in ways no more subjective or objective in nature than those of "physical doctors." In
addition, psychiatrists review medical records on patients--the kind of objective data that some
post-Nord courts set within the purview of non-psychiatric physicians. Psychiatrists review these
records to determine if there is a history of a malady, and to discern the cause of the psychiatric
distress. Poling Interview, shpra note 50, at Line 171.
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ments, exacerbate one another, and share biological pathways and
neurotranstitters.

66

Studies have shown that depressed patients had a greatly increased occurrence of physical pain, were more often fatigued, and wound up utilizing
more health resources than those patients who did not suffer from depression. 67 Further, the presence of pain can mask the diagnosis of depression.
The study found that
At least 75% of primary care patients with depression present with
physical complaints exclusively and seldom attribute their pain symptoms to depression or other psychiatric illness. These physical complaints may be due to amplification of chronic physical disease and
68
remain medically unexplained after extensive workup.

The consequence of this misunderstanding leads to medical treatment for the
pain exclusively, rather than an exploration of "the pain symptoms in a broad' 69
er, biopsychosocial context.
Acknowledgement of this relationship between psychological and physi70
cal medical disorders is found in Sheehan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
66. Matthew J. Bair, Rebecca L. Robinson, Wayne Katon & Kurt Kroenke, Depression and
Pain Comorbidiy: A literature Review, 163 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 2433 (Nov. 10,
2003).
67. Id.at 2434. Other findings of the studies that support this mind-body pain continuum-one that casts doubt upon the rationale of a psychiatric-subjective/physical-objective dichotomy--include the followingA large longitudinal cohort study has shown that depressive symptoms predict future
episodes of low back pain, neck-shoulder pain, and musculoskeletal symptoms compared with those patients without depressive symptoms at baseline ....Several studies
have reported the association between depression and pain, specifically addressing how
the risk of depression increases as a function of different aspects of worsening pain
(e.g., severity, frequency, duration and number of symptoms). Patients with multiple
pain symptoms (e.g , back pain, headache, abdominal pain, chest pain, and facial pain)
are 3-5 times more likely to be depressed than patients without pain, and pain symptoms are associated with at least a two-fold increased risk for Co-existing depression.
Additionally, a population-based study showed that subjects with chronic pain (define
as pain for most days for at least a month) are 3 times as likely to meet depression criteriaas those without chronic pain. The association between depression and pain becomes stronger as the severity of either condition increases. Id.at 235.
68. Id.at 241.
69. Id.Some physical conditions are so deeply related to psychiatric conditions that doctors in both fields are often called upon for treatment, such as fibromyalgia, panic attack, and
anorexia nervosa. Interview by Roy F. Harmon, Jr., M.D. with Mark Seego, M.D., in Columbia,
Tennessee (Sept. 17, 2008) Line 727 [hereinafter Seego Interview] (on file with author). In
children, chronic abdominal pains and migraines are commonly associated with psychological
stress. Interview by Roy F. Harmon, Jr., M.D. with Tony Smith, M.D. and Carol Broadway,
M.D., in Columbia, Tennessee (Sept. 12, 2008) Line 727 [hereinafter Smith Interview] (on file
with author). A call for an integration of legal and medical definitions of disability through a
strong treating physician rule, one that acknowledges that "disability it context-driven," is made
in Schneider's article, supra note 24.
70. 368 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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There, the court cited "co-morbidity" as one of the reasons that the disability
determination was so complex. 71 Comordity is the coexistence of two or more
conditions that contribute to a patient's life-threatening condition. In Sheehan,
the patient, who had experienced a major heart attack, also suffered from
"cardiac neurosis," an intense fear of a cardiac recurrence that itself contributed to the patient's poor health. 72 Such a condition would be classified under the DSM as "Anxiety Disorder Due to a General Medical Condition," i.e.,
anxiety that arises from a stressor that is medical in nature, as opposed to
some other normal stressor. 73 The Sheehan court recognized the duality of the
patient's illness when it spoke of two medical diagnoses failure to take into
account both physical and psychiatric dimensions:
Sheehan's comorbid illnesses of coronary artery disease and cardiac
neurosis rendered him totally disabled....MetLife's medical evidence
fails to squarely address this issue. That failure stems from Dr. Stein's
narrow focus upon Sheehan's cardiac condition to the exclusion of
any psychiatric condition, and Dr. Givens's narrow focus upon Sheehan's psychiatric condition to the exclusion of any cardiac condition.
Both Dr. Stein and Dr. Givens were expressing opinions about a patient who did not and does not exist. Sheehan did not suffer from a
cardiac condition alone or from a psychiatric condition alone. He suffered, and suffers, from both. As the result of comorbidity, Sheehan
is affected by "a confluence of factors contributing to sickness," in
Dr. Charno's phrase; "a very vicious cycle,"74 in Dr. Parti's phrase.
That confluence, that cycle, disables Sheehan.
The Court's understanding of the condition's complexity is in keeping with
75
the mind-body pain continuum that medical practice recognizes.
71. Id. at 258.
72. Id.
73. DSM, supra note 64, at 436. Of course, clinical anxiety can also arise from normal,
non-medical stressors--such as the loss of a family member. When the level of anxiety relative
to the normal stressor is disproportionate, it is classified as Adjustment Disorder. Abnormal
stressors, such as battlefield trauma or criminal violence, lead to "post-traumatic stress." See id.
at 623.
74. Sheehan, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
75. Other co-dependent physical and psychological conditions are classified by the DSM
as "anxiety due to a general medical condition." DSM, supra note 64, at 623. In such a case,
trying to distinguish between which evidence is subjective, related to the psychiatric component
of the malady, as opposed to the purely physical illness, would be a futile process. In fact, a
common index used by doctors of all disciplines is the Charlson Comorbidity Index, which
predicts the one-year mortality rate for patients that have a range of comorbid conditions.
"Dementia" is included among contributors to comorbid conditions. Mary E. Charlson, Peter
Pompei, Kathy L. Ales & C. Ronald MacKenzie, A New Method of Classiffing PrognosticComorbidoy
in LongitudinalStudies: Development and Validation, 40 J. CHRONIC Dis. 373 (1987); see also Molly
Sachdev, Jie Lena Sun, Anastasios A. Tsiatis, Charlotte L. Nelson, Daniel B. Mark & James G.
Jollis, The Prognostic Importance of Comorbidi for Mortaky in Patients with Stable Coronary Arter Disease, 43 J. OF THE AM. Coi. OF CARDIOLOGY 576 (2004). The very existence and use of such
indices belies the easy distinctions made by the post-Nord psychiatric cases.
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Another example of the sticky wicket of the pain/psychosis distinction is
the recent decision of Champion v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc.7 6 There, however,
the court found the interplay between psychiatric and purely medical disorders
to be defeating of the plaintiff's claims. Champion brought suit when Black
and Decker terminated her disability benefits on the grounds that her illness
stemmed from mental problems, only covered for thirty months under her
ERISA plan. Champion suffered from seizures that were multi-determined:
Her actual epileptic seizures were mostly of thepetite mal or "absence"
variety and were thereafter controlled with medication. Treating physicians noticed that Champion also reported seizure-like events that
were not epileptic seizures. These events were sometimes characterized as panic attacks and sometimes as "pseudoseizures." Pseudoseizures are a recognized medical diagnosis with symptoms closely resembling epilepsy, causing physicians often to misdiagnose one as the
other. Champion was also diagnosed with various emotional and psychiatric conditions including anxiety, depression, panic attacks, and

77
post-traumatic stress disorder.
The lower court remanded the case, asking that the Plan determine the
proper classification of Champion's disability and give her a chance to submit
additional evidence. Champion's physician's opinions were to the effect that
she was totally disabled by her epilepsy and pseudoseizures. However, the
Plan concluded that the epilepsy was treatable with medication, and that the
pseudoseizures were a mental health disorder. The termination was reaffirmed
by the Plan, and the district court agreed that there was no abuse of discretion.
Upon reviewing the facts, the Fourth Circuit held that Champion's pseudoseizures fell within the defined range for mental health disabilities]78 It also

implied that had she been able to base her claim on the physical dimension of
her seizures alone, her complaint on appeal might have met with different

results:
Champion produced no evidence showing or tending to show that
she could substantiate her disability claim on just her epilepsy. She
produced persuasive evidence that she is disabled by herpseudoseiZures

and epilepy. But because the Plan reasonably concluded that her pseudoseizures fell within the definition of mental health disability, her

evidence does not support a claim that her epilepsy alone rendered
her unable to work within the Plan's definition of disability.

In contrast, the Plan provided substantial reasons to believe that
Champion would not be disabled without her mental health disabilities. Dr. Ebeling concluded from the record that Champion's physical
76. 550 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2008).
77. Id. at 356-57.
78. Id. at 357. Champion offered evidence that her psychoseizures arose from physical
causes, but the Court noted that the plan excluded mental disabilities whatever their causes-physical, medical, mental, or organic.
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seizures were "relatively infrequent, not intractable, and would not
preclude her from any occupation which does not require her to operate machinery or work at unprotected heights." In accepting this
conclusion, the Plan acted reasonably, especially when Champion's
79
own correspondence with the Plan supports the conclusion.
Although the two cases ultimately turned upon different grounds, comparison of the two maladies themselves--cardiac neurosis on the one hand,
pseudoseizures on the other--and the respective courts' treatments of the interplay between these mental maladies with the purely physical diseases with
which they co-occurred, is worthy of note. In one instance, the co-occurrence
of the diseases is a factor in the court's decision; in the other, the cooccurrence is what proves damning to the claim. The two cases highlight the
shifting ground upon which courts stand when faced with disability claims of
two natures: physical and psychiatric.
B. ERISA Cases Favoring an Exception for Psychiatric Conditions
The opinion in Sheehan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. has frequently
been cited in support of favoring treating physicians' opinions when mental
symptoms are in issue.80 Sheehan is a particularly interesting case in that it involved a disability claim based upon the aforementioned cardiac and psychiatric conditions combined. Again, this multi-caused medical condition is
81
known in the medical vernacular as "comorbidity."
MetLife attempted to controvert Sheehan's psychiatrist's opinion on the
strength of the opinion of a psychiatrist who had only reviewed Sheehan's file.
The court noted that "[w]hile the file contained a written report by ... Sheehan's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Givens [MetLife's reviewing physician] did not
examine or interview Sheehan himself." The court faulted MetLife's psychiatric evaluation of Sheehan on this point. It observed that:
Courts discount the opinions of psychiatrists who have never seen
the patient for obvious reasons. Unlike cardiologists or orthopedists,
who can formulate medical opinions based upon objective findings
derived from objective clinical tests, the psychiatrist typically treats
his patient's subjective symptoms. 82

79.
80.
81.

Id.
at 361.
Sheehan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 368 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.

82. Sheehan, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 255. Questions regarding the admissibility of subjective
pain testimony in disability determinations also have a long history. See generally Margaret C.
Rodgers, Subjective Pain Testimony in Disabiry Determination Proceedings: Can PainAlone be Disabling?,

28 CAL. W. L. REv. 173 (1991). The Eighth Circuit set out what are known as the "Polski factors" as means for evaluating subjective complaints of pain in a Social Security disability case.
The factors include: 1) the amount of pain; 2) the daily activities of the claimant; 3) the effects
of medication; 4) any precipitating and irritating factors; and 5) any functional restrictions.

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). However, the same court refused to
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The Sheehan court noted that the primacy of personal observation of
such symptoms over remote evaluation finds support in other legal contexts.
Collecting cases in a variety of different contexts, the court observed that
"[c]ourts routinely discount or entirely disregard the opinions of psychiatrists
who had not examined the individual in question at all or for only a limited
time." 13
Importantly, the Sheehan court did not state its conclusions in categorical
terms. In fact, the court took care to avoid such an interpretation of its holding, stating:
I do not undertake in this opinion to suggest a per se rule that a long
term disability insurer can never conclude that a beneficiary is not
psychiatrically disabled unless the insurer's psychiatric expert has examined the beneficiary. There may be an unusual case where ... a
consulting psychiatrist can arrive at a sound opinion without ever ex84
amining, seeing or interviewing the individual in question.

Nonetheless, on the facts presented, the court concluded that the testimony of a psychiatrist that never examined the plaintiff did not constitute
substantial evidence supporting a denial of benefits.
Likewise, the Second Circuit, in Winkler v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., an
unpublished opinion, expressed reservations about benefit denials based upon
the views of non-examining consultants. 85 The Court noted that MetLife
based its decision "entirely on the opinions of three independent consultants
who never personally examined [the plaintiffl." 86 The Court reconciled its
holding with Nord by commenting that, "[w]hile administrators may credit
apply the factors in the ERISA context: "We see no reason to import wholesale, into what is
essentially a private-law area, special rules developed for reviewing the decisions of administrative agencies." Conley v. Pitney Bowes, 176 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (8th Cir. 1999).
83. Sheehan, 368 F.Supp.2d at 254 (dling People v. Espinoza, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 700, 718-19
(Ct. App. 2002) ("in a prosecution for molestation of a child, 'L,' where defendant 'proposed to
introduce testimony by a psychiatrist who had never examined I- that L. did not suffer from any
mental illnesses diagnosed by any of the psychiatrists who actually examined her,' appellate
court affirmed trial court's ruling that 'the proffered evidence was speculative and therefore had
little probative value")); see also Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
("We think it necessary to point out that the value of a psychiatrist's testimony depends largely
upon his opportunities for observation and the facts he observes.'); Jones v. United States, 327
F.2d 867, 879-80 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("Here the psychiatric evaluation apparently took but a few
seconds and was limited to observing the patient during that time through prison bars"; report
of psychiatric panel that defendant was mentally competent based upon so limited an observation "would not, in any event, be a predicate for any such adjudication') (Wright , J., concurring); Campbell v. United States, 307 F.2d 597, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("Appellant says, and we
agree, that the testimony of the psychiatrist relied upon by the Government was of little probative value. The psychiatrist had no information about the defendant's mental condition, testified
largely in terms of a legal conclusion, and had never seen defendant prior to the trial.").
84. Sheehan, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 255 n. 18.
85. Winkler v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 170 F. App'x. 167, 2006 WL 509487 (C.A.2 (N.Y.
2006)).
86. Id. at *2.
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their own reliable evidence over the statements of treatment providers,
MetLife's exclusive reliance on second-hand opinions adds to the overall pic'87
ture of its decision as less than fair."
Though the Court went on to cite Sheehan for the proposition that
"[f]irst-hand observation is especially important in the context of assessing
psychiatric disabilities," 88 the opinion stopped short of stating this principle in
categorical terms. Noting other irregularities in MetLife's decisional approach, 89 the Court reserved the issue of "whether any factor, on its own,
would warrant vacatur." 90

Similarly, a Sixth Circuit unpublished opinion, Smith v. Bayer Coo. Long
Term Disabilioy Plan, emphasized the importance of personal observation in
psychiatric cases, stating that:
[Though] the court in Sheehan engaged in de novo review, Sheehan's
point is still relevant for our, albeit deferential, review of the medical
evidence, because Sheehan highlights the inadequacy of record review
when determining benefits for someone claiming a mental disability.
An examination could have helped the plan administrator to better
evaluate the severity of Smith's symptoms. 91
The Court took care to distinguish Nord, observing that the opinions of
treating physicians "should not necessarily be accepted over those of reviewing experts simply because the treating physicians physically examined the
claimant. ' 92 The distinction drawn by the Court bears directly on the issue of
whether the preference of treating physician opinions constitutes, in effect, an
adoption of the treating physician rule. Reconciling its holding with Nord, the
Court explained:
Though Bayer characterizes the district court decision as importing a
treating-physician rule contrary to Black & Decker Disability Plan v.
Nord, the district court did not do so. Rather, the district court
deemed arbitrary and capricious the plan administrator's refusal to
credit Smith's reliable evidence. That Bayer can point to opinions
from its own experts does not insulate its decision from review, because we must "review the quality and quantity of the medical evidence and the opinions on both sides of the issues." Based on the
facts of this case, rather than on a blanket rule of according outcomedeterminative weight to treating or examining physicians, we deter87. Id.
88. Id. (dting Sheehan, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 255).
89. For example, "MetLife's final denial relied (as had its consultants) on the absence of
any objective cognitive testing, notwithstanding that MetLife never raised this issue with Wink" and suggestions that MetLife "cherryler during the various stages of his application ...
pick[ed]" the evidence. Winkler, 170 F. App'x at *2.
90. Id. at *I.
91. Smith v. Bayer Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 275 F. App'x 495, 508 (6th Cir.
2008).
92. Id at 507-08.
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mine that Bayer arbitrarily and capriciously rejected Smith's evidence
and breached its fiduciary duty to make certain that reliance on its experts' advice was reasonably justified under the circumstances. 93

Thus, the Court distances its approach from one employing a rule of
weight by casting the analysis in terms of a case-by-case review of the quality
and quantity of medical evidence.
The district court's opinion in Wesphal v. Eastman Kodak Co. appears to
take the weight analysis a step further. In that case, the court held that an
ERISA plan administrator abused its discretion when it disregarded the opinions of the claimant's two treating physicians in favor of contrary opinions
94
by two reviewing physicians.
Noting the deferential standard of review required under the terms of
the ERISA plan, the Court observed that the plan administrator's decision
must be upheld unless the decision was "without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law."95 In view of the claimant's
symptoms, however, the court concluded that the plan administrator's decision could not be sustained even under this liberal standard.
The plaintiff applied for early retirement based upon disability after
twenty years' employment with Kodak. 96 In support of the disability claim, the
plaintiff cited various conditions including loss of sleep, memory loss, manic
depression, CPD [chronic pulmonary diseasel, and angina. 97 Two treating
physicians' opinions supported this claim, one from his treating physician and
the other from his treating psychiatrist. 98 In addition, the claim was supported
by an independent psychiatric evaluation obtained during application for Social Security benefits. 99
Nonetheless, the plan administrator rejected the claim based upon the
opinions of two reviewing physicians. The district court took particular note
of the fact that the opinions were of doctors who had not treated or examined
the claimant. The court concluded that in cases of psychiatric disability
claims, the "inherent subjectivity of a psychiatric diagnosis requires the physician rendering the diagnosis to personally observe the claimant."100 Distinguishing Nord, the court stated that:
While it is true that a Plan Administrator is not required to give a preference to a treating physician's opinion, the Administrator must
support his findings with substantial evidence. In this case, the substantial evidence does not support a finding that the plaintiff is not
93. Id. at 508 (citations omitted).
94. Westphal v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 05-CV-6120, 2006 WL 1720380, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. June 21,2006).
95. Id. at *2.
96. Id. at *1.
97. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Weohal, 2006 WL 1720380, at *4.
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disabled because the evidence reveals that every doctor who treated
or examined the patient found him to be disabled. The only evidence
that suggests that plaintiff is disabled is insubstantial in that it consists
of two reports prepared by doctors who did not have the benefit of
observing the plaintiff in person. As stated above, the opportunity to
interview and interact with a psychiatric patient is crucial to the diagnosis of a psychiatric disability. Therefore, this case is distinguishable
from a case involving a physical injury, where a diagnosis may be
more properly based on the review of objective medical evidence by a
non-examining doctor.10 1
Given the "inherent subjectivity of a psychiatric diagnosis," the court
opined that "it is arbitrary and capricious to rely on the opinion of a nontreating, non-examining doctor... "102
Likewise, the district court in Morse v. Coming Inc. Pension Plan for Hourly
Employees reached a similar conclusion, relying extensively on the Westphal
decision.10 3 As in Wes/phal, the claimant offered opinions of her treating physician and therapist in support of her disability claim.10 4 The plan administrator
denied the claim for benefits based upon the opinions of reviewing physicians
105
who had not treated or examined the plaintiff.
After exhaustion of administrative remedies, suit was filed in federal district court. Quoting Wesiphal, the court stated:
Therefore, in the context of a psychiatric evaluation, an opinion
based on personal examination is inherently more reliable than an
opinion based on a cold record because observation of the patient is
critical to understanding the subjective nature of the patient's disease
and in making a reasoned diagnosis. Subtleties in the patient's mannerisms, the nuances that are derived from her speech and gestures
cannot be observed and evaluated by the non-examining physician.
This is all necessary in the evaluation process and cannot be done in
absentia nor by merely evaluating the treating physicians' notes and
106
opinions.
The Morse court's view of what is entailed in a psychiatric diagnosis is most
07
representative of the subjective/objective distinction question above.
C. Cases Opposing an Exception for Psychiatric Conditions
In opposition to the foregoing cases, several decisions have rejected the
view that psychiatric symptoms require elevated consideration of treating phy-

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at *6.
Id. at *4.
Morse, No. 05-CV-6318, 2007 WL 610628, at *9.
Id. at *8.
Id.
at *3.
Id (citing Wesobal, 2006 WL 1720380 at *5).
See supra section III.A.
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sician opinions. In Kushner v. Lhigh Cement Co., for example, the district court
distinguished Sheehan based upon its facts.10 8 Sheehan, observed the court, involved application of a de novo standard of review. 0 9 From this perspective,
the Sheehan holding is limited to the relatively uncommon scenario in which
the plan administrator has not reserved to itself discretion in reviewing benefit
denials.
The court explained that the de novo standard of review permitted consideration of treating physician opinions beyond that available when review is
limited to considerations of abuse of discretion by the administrator, stating:
Plaintiff misapplies Sheehan v. Metropolitan life Ins. Co., 368 F.Supp.2d
228 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) in which the district court found the administrator assessed only a claimant's cardiac condition, not his co-morbid
psychiatric complaints. The court considered additional evidence regarding the reliability of the treating physician's testimony only for
use with a de novo review.... Unlike Sheehan, an abuse of discretion
standard applies, and LINA also appropriately evaluated both of
plaintiff's purported conditions. 110
Moreover, the court in Kushner further limited Sheehan to its facts based
upon the Sheehan court's concession that the opinions of reviewing physicians that had not examined the claimant may prevail over treating physician
opinions in some cases. The court noted that Sheehan "acknowledged that
face-to-face contact between an insurer's psychiatric expert and the claimant is
not always necessary.""' Actually, the Sheehan opinion categorized that scenario as "unusual," but the court did conduct de novo review, and the opinion
does reject a "per se" rule favoring examining physician opinions.12
Though the Kushner court distinguished Sheehan based largely upon the
standard of review applied, Kushner rejects a key premise assumed in Sheehan.
As the Sixth Circuit stated in Smith v. Bayer Corp. Long Term Disabilioy Plan, supra, regardless of the standard of review, "Sheehan's point is still relevant for
[an], albeit deferential, review of the medical evidence, because Sheehan highlights the inadequacy of record review when determining benefits for someone claiming a mental disability." 3 Kushner explicidy rejects this proposition,
citing "the wide acceptance in ERISA and disability cases of record reviews by
psychiatrists and other doctors, without in person examinations, to uphold the
propriety of claims decisions based on such reviews." 114
108.
109.
110.

Kushner v. Lehigh Cement Co., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1192 n. 9 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
Id.
Id.

111. Id.
112. Sheehan, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 255 n. 18.
113. Smith, 275 F. App'x 495 at 508.
114. Kushner, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.; see also Semien v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 436 F.3d
805, 812 (7th Cir. 2006) (denial upheld where independent psychiatric consultant reviewed
claimant's medical history without personal examination); Vercher v. Alexander & Alexander
Inc., 379 F.3d 222, 230 (5th Cir. 2004) (record review by psychiatric consultant supported ad-
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On the other hand, the district court in Gannon v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,
rejected the "categorical rules" stated in cases such as Westphal as inconsistent
with the rejection of the "treating physician rule" in Nord.' 5 Quoting the Nord
opinion, the court noted a preference for "preserv[ing] the greatest flexibility
for... operating claims processing systems consistent with the prudent admin6
istration of a plan."
The district court also rejected the reasoning in the Sheehan line of cases
in Island View Residential Treatment Ctr. Inc. v. Bluecross Blueshield of Mass., Inc.,17
on similar grounds. Cases suggesting that "an exception exists for determining whether a claimant is disabled in psychiatric cases" create an unjustified
exception to Nordin the view of the court." 8
The Island View court also distinguished Sheehan, noting that:
In all the cases cited where a court found a psychiatric exception, the
issue was whether a claimant was disabled. The insurance providers
denied disability benefits because non-treating doctors determined
the claimants were not disabled. The non-treating physicians' diagnoses were in direct conflict with the plaintiffs' treating physicians'
conclusions regarding the claimant's disabilities.11 9
By contrast, the court observed, the case at bar did not involve a disputed diagnosis but rather "a determination of whether certain types of treatment were reimbursable given [the claimant's] condition and her health insurance plan." 120 In other words, Sheehan addressed a difference in medical opinion on the question of impairment as opposed to whether the claimant was
"eligible to receive reimbursement for treatment based on her symptoms and
insurance."121

ministrator's appropriate determination that plaintiff should not receive disability benefits);
Parker v. Kemper Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48885, at *25-28 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (no independent medical examination required where two physicians and a psychologist analyzed the
medical record); Fox v. Kaiser Found. Employee Benefit Plan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40975, at
*48-49 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (denial of benefits relying on psychiatric consultant record review was
reasonable); Toth v. Auto. Club of Cal. Long Term Disability Plan, No. CV014653MMIMRCX,
2005 WL 1877150, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2005) (no obligation to conduct psychiatric IME);
Lawless v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (no
abuse of discretion where insurer obtained two psychiatric consulting record reviews); Voight v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 28 F. Supp. 2d 569, 580 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (upholding insurer's denial
in part based on psychiatric record reviews).
115. Gannon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 05 Civ. 21600GK), 2007 WL 2844869, at *13 n. 6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2007).
116. Id.
117. Island View Residential Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Bluecross Blueshield of Mass., Inc.,
Civil Action No. 07-10581 -DPW, 2007 WL 4589335, at *24 (D. Mass. Dec. 28, 2007).
118. Id.
119. Id.at *25.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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IV.

DIFFICULTIES IN DERIVATION OF PRINCIPLES OF REVIEW

The problem thus stated by the foregoing authorities is whether a consistent principle may be found that (1) can justify the preference given treating
physician opinions in the series of district court opinions discussed above; and
(2) is consistent with circumscribed role of such opinions allowed for in Nord.
A range of factors peculiar to the factual and legal aspects of benefit claims
complicates this task.
Aside from the specific question of the relative value to be assigned
medical opinions, reconciling decisions in which courts exercise judicial review of ERISA benefit denials already poses significant challenges. The reasons are several. First, disability claims exhibit a considerable variance in the
basis for the benefit claim, ranging from differences in symptoms, supporting
and opposing evidence, and disabilities claimed. Second, the procedural history of a claim can make an enormous difference in outcome.
Perhaps most significant, however, is the variance in the standard of
judicial review. In most disability cases, the plan documents will confer discretion on the plan administrator. Under the seminal Supreme Court decision,
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, if a plan administrator possesses discretionary authority, the district court reviews benefit denials under the deferential
"arbitrary and capricious' standard. 122 As has been apdy noted, "it is incredibly difficult for an insured to defeat summary judgment in an ERISA case
under the arbitrary and capricious standard." 123
Adding to the complexity in some cases, such as Sheehan, for example,
the plan documents will not grant the necessary discretion (typically by oversight). In such cases, judicial review will be more searching, since the standard
is de novo. Moreover, even in cases where the abuse of discretion standard
applies, the reviewing court may take into account the plan administrator's
conflict of interest where the same entity both funds claims payment and adjudicates benefit disputes. 124 Thus, the variance in the standard applied by the
reviewing court complicates the derivation of general principles from the case
law.
Therefore, extrapolating general principles from judicial opinions requires great attention to context. Yet, some useful generalizations may nonetheless be discovered in the cases. The following section will attempt to identify some of these principles before evaluating the post-Nord cases addressing
psychiatric or mental symptoms.

122.
123.
Il. June
124.

Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989).
Fischer v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., No. 05 C 3256, 2008 WL 4874302, at *6 (N.D.
16, 2008).
Id.
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A. The Rule of Reason: Nord v. Black & Decker
Nord rejected the importation, as it were, of the treating physician rule as
it is understood in the context of Social Security disability cases. The Nord
opinion did not give plan administrators absolute discretion, however, as it
made clear from its concluding remarks. Though rejection of the treating physician rule, as understood in Social Security cases, means that courts will not
"automatically... accord special weight to the opinions of a claimant's physician," neither may plan administrators "arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant's
25
reliable evidence, including the opinions of a treating physician.'
Nord framed the treating physician rule as one imposing a categorical
("automatic") requirement that treating physician's opinions be given credit
for a privileged (though defeasible) status of correctness - in other words,
"special weight." In rejecting this rule, the Court stated its position in terms
of reasonableness.
A plan administrator abuses its discretion when it arbitrarily - that is,
without a principled, rational basis - denies a claim for benefits. Refusing to
credit the opinion of a treating physician is objectively unreasonable and, as
such, arbitrary. On the other hand, if a court finds that the plan administrator
has- considered the treating physician's opinion, but sided with the reviewing
physician, the question of whether the treating physician's opinion was given
proper credit becomes more complicated.
B. Review of "Quality and Quantity" of Evidence Required
The Nord requirement of reasonableness has been expanded upon in
opinions that explain what review is required under an abuse of discretion
standard. Stated negatively, the highly deferential standard of review does not
require uncritical adherence to the plan administrator's decision. 126 Otherwise, judicial review would comprise no more than a "rubber stamp" of the
decision by the plan. As the Seventh Circuit has said, "'Deferential review is
1 27
not no review,' and "deference need not be abject."
The proper lens through which to analyze physicians' opinions, whether
treating or not, thus becomes the Nord metrics of the "quality and quantity" of
the evidence. From this perspective, the plan administrator need not give
"special weight" to the assessments of treating physicians, but neither may it
"arbitrarily refuse to credit U[the] claimant's reliable evidence, including the
opinions of... treating physician[s]." 128 While there is 'nothing inherently
objectionable about a file review by a qualified physician in the context of a
benefits determination," the very fact of "file review" remains "a factor to be
125. Nord,538 U.S. at 834.
126. McDonald v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 161 (6th Cir. 2003).
127. Hess v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 274 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cit. 2001).
128. Michaels v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, No. 07-4256, 2009 WL
19344, at *9 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 2009).
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considered in reviewing the propriety of an administrator's decision regarding
benefits."' 29 In view of the Supreme Court's application of a multi-factor
analysis in judicial review of benefit denials by conflicted fiduciaries (infra,
page 35), the isolation of file review as a factor for evaluation is quite significant.
The Sixth Circuit has refined the analysis of file review as a factor properly considered in judicial review in a series of opinions. The foundation for
this analysis lies in the premise that the reviewing court is not foreclosed from
reviewing the "quality and quantity of medical evidence."' 130 As the Sixth Circuit stated:
This obligation inherenly includes some review of the quality and

quantity of the medical evidence and the opinions on both sides of
the issues. Otherwise, courts would be rendered to nothing more
than rubber stamps for any plan administrator's decision as long as
the plan was able to find a single piece of evidence-no matter how
obscure or untrustworthy-to support a denial of a claim for ERISA
131
benefits.
Thus, the reviewing court should evaluate the treating physician's opinion in
view not only of the cumulative effect of the conclusions, but also from the
standpoint of the quality of the diagnostic conclusions. When plan adninistrators make "important credibility determinations regarding a claimant's medical
history based solely on a file review," the Sixth Circuit has suggested that a file
132
review of the patient's medical history may be inadequate.
The effect of this consideration favors the treating physician's opinion in
a number of factual settings. For example, in Turner v. Retirement & Benefit Plans
Committee Robert Bosch CoFp.,133 the court favored the treating physicians' opinions as forensically superior to those of the reviewing physicians. The court
stated:
In the interests of clarity, the court emphasizes that it does not find
these physicians more persuasive simply because they are Plaintiffs
treating physicians. Instead, it finds their opinions more persuasive
for the simple fact that they have more information upon which to

129. Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F.Supp.2d 785, 795 (W.D. Mich. 2009)
(citing Evans v. UnumProvident Corp., 434 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2006)).
130. McDonald, 347 F.3d at 172.
131. Id.
132. Epling v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 08-02-ART, 2009 WL 129785, at
*8 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2009) (citing, Calvert v. Firstar Fin., Inc., 409 F.3d 286, 297 n.6 (6th Cir.
2005)); see also Creel v. Wachovia Corp., No. 08-10961, 2009 WL 179584, at *8 n.22 (11 th Cir.
Fla. Jan. 27, 2009) ("[mhe decision not to accord special weight to the views of the claimant's
physician must be based on 'reliable evidence,' which would involve something more than a
paper-based peer review for disabilities involving subjective proof.").
133. 585 F. Supp. 2d 692 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2007).
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than physicians who only have the benefit of a
base such opinions
134
written record.
Viewed in context, a focus on the quality and quantity of evidence will
not always present advantages to the treating physician's opinions. First, in
some instances the patient's medical conditions will be adequately presented
in the medical records. Secondly, the review of the treating physician's opinion may be countered by evidence derived from an independent medical
examination. In other words, the apparent preference given treatingphysidans'
opinions in post-Nord cases is better comprehended as a preference for the
insights of an examining physician in some contexts. This advantage does not
belong exclusively to the treating physician.
Moreover, where the dispute centers not on the patient's diagnosis, but
on the effect of that diagnosis under the benefit plan or insurance policy, the
significance of the examining physician's perspective will be diminished.1 35 In
such cases, the province of the physician is circumscribed since the determination turns not on evidence, but on legal interpretation. Finally, the credentials
or experience of the treating physician on the medical question under review
may lead to doubts as to his or her conclusions notwithstanding any advantages otherwise inherent in the opportunity for direct observation of the patient.

136

C. The Effect of Conflicts of Interest: MetLzjfe v. Glenn
Since the Nord decision, the Supreme Court has revisited the issue of
conflicts of interests in judicial review of benefit denials. In Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Glenn, the Court confirmed that the payment of benefits by the
same entity that adjudicated claims constituted a conflict of interest. 37 In such
cases, the Court stated that the reviewing court must take into account "several different, often case-specific, factors, reaching a result by weighing all together."' 38 Where a conflict of interest is found to exist, any one factor will

134.

Id.
at 707 n.9.

135. Doe v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 05-2512, 2008 WL
5400984, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2008) (the significance of a treating physician versus nontreating physician is minimized as Doe's condition is not in dispute; what is in dispute is how
bipolar disorder is meant to be treated under the Policy language); Fitzpatrick v. Bayer Corp.,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3532, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2008) ("the operative question in this case
is not whether Plaintiff actually suffered from CFS and/or fibromyalgia, but instead whether
the Plaintiff's CFS and/or fibromyalgia rendered her 'totally disabled' within the definition of
the Plan and thus unable to work").
136. Cf.Dennison v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-317-DCK, 2009 WL
77216, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2009) ("The Defendants point out that the Plaintiff's holistic
doctor has no training or expertise in occupational training and provided no objective medical
data to support her conclusions.').

137.
138.

128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008).
Id. at 2345.
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act as a tiebreaker in close cases: "the degree of closeness necessary depending
139
upon the tiebreaking factor's inherent or case-specific importance."'
Glenn's effect on disability determinations will be interesting to observe.
In most cases, the disability carrier will be deemed conflicted, since it will both
pay claims and adjudicate benefit claims. To what extent, then, will the disregard of treating physicians' opinions constitute a significant factor in judicial
review? While that issue remains open--and most likely, a matter for case by
case consideration--the rule of reason enunciated in Nord should require more
of the plan administrator in terms of a principled, rational decision than if a
conflict were not found to exist.
The emergence of the pragmatic factor-based approach in evaluating the
effect a conflict should have in judicial review of benefit denials has an ironic
twist. As discussed, supra, the neglect of the treating physician's opinions in
Regula v. Delta Famiy-Care Disability Survivorship Plan,played an important role
in the Ninth Circuit conclusion that the plan fiduciary's benefit decisions were
tainted by a conflict of interest. 14°
While the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's countermeasure of
applying a treating physician rule in such cases, Nord did not foreclose scrutiny
of the benefit decision along the lines of whether the treating physician's opinions had been given due regard along with other reliable evidence. At this
juncture, the concerns that animated the Ninth Circuit in Regula intersect with
the factor-based review called for by the Supreme Court in Glenn.
After the Glenn decision, the district courts may take all factors bearing
on the decision of conflicted fiduciaries into account (though they must retain
the abuse of discretion standard of review if called for by the plan document).
If file review of a patient's medical history may be isolated as a factor, as the
Sixth Circuit has suggested it may, then principles of judicial review of conflicted fiduciary's decisions come near to embracing one of the premises of
the Regula opinion.
The Regula Court observed that "in light of the Plan's apparent conflict
of interest, the administrator's decision to reject the opinions of the appellant's treating physicians constitutes material, probative evidence of a conflict.' 14 1 What Nord, and more recently, Glenn, demonstrate, however, is that
the evaluation of physician opinions, as well as the presence and effect of
conflicts of interest, must be evaluated without resort to "special burden-ofproof rules, or other special procedural or evidentiary rules, focused narrowly
142
upon the evaluator/payor conflict."'

139. Id.
at 2351.
140. Regula v. Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan, 266 F.3d 1130, 1147 (9th
Cir. 2001), vacated by Delta Family-Care Disability & Survivorship Plan v. Regula, 539 U.S. 901
(2003).
141.
142.

Id.
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2345 (2008).
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V. ASSAYING PHYSICIAN OPINIONS' WEIGHT AFTER NORD

In view of the foregoing principles, the line of cases favoring treating
physician opinions in the setting of psychiatric or mental illness symptoms
appears reconcilable with Nord, for the most part. The rationale for these
decisions has most frequently been rooted in the superior information available to the treating physician for evaluating the patient's condition.
When courts evaluate a benefit denial based upon information available
to the physician rendering an opinion, the courts do no more than follow
Nord's rule of reason. Plan administrators must not unreasonably refuse to
credit the reliable evidence offered by a claim, including the opinions of treating physicians, in reaching a decision on a benefits claim.
In Sheehan, Winkler, and Smith, supra, the courts avoided an "automatic"
credit of any "special weight" to the treating physician's opinions. On the
other hand, the courts did view the treating physicians as having a better posture for evaluating the disability of the claimant. These decisions are supported by a review of the quality and quantity of the medical evidence and the
opinions on both sides of the issues.
To the extent that courts have emphasized the importance of subjective
versus objective symptoms, however, the analysis has strayed into unnecessary
ambiguity. The Sheehan court heeded the boundary necessary after Nord by
avoiding adoption of a per se rule.
The Westphal court's opinion, on the other hand, appears to extend considerably further. By concluding that "in the context of a psychiatric evaluation, an opinion based on personal examination is inherently more reliable
than an opinion based on a cold record because observation of the patient"
due to the "subjective" nature of the patient's disease, the court goes too far.

A rule of weight is no more than a classification of evidence without based
upon predetermined experience with outcomes.
While the Weszhats opinion may be justified on the facts, the conclusion
that a class of opinions may be "inherently" superior based upon the subjective nature of the complaints constitutes a categorical approach to medical
evidence antithetical to the Nord holding. As suggested in Island View, supra,
such "categorical rules" are inconsistent with the rejection of rules of weight
inNord.143
143. Of interest in the Social Security Administration's own acknowledgement of the objective and subjective sides of medicine: "[Treating sources] are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the daimant's] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained
" 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) (2006).
from objective medical findings alone ....
Rachel Schneider's article also points to the Social Security Administration's policy statement,
which acknowledges that: "'[Olpinions always have a subjective component, because the effects
of medical conditions on individuals vary so widely, and because no two cases are ever exactly
alike, it is not possible to create rules that prescribe the weight to be given to each piece of
evidence that [may be taken] into consideration in every case."' Schneider, supra note 25, at 402
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What is largely unaddressed thus far, however, is the effect of the decision in MetLtjfe v. Glenn on the issue of the weight accorded treating physician's
opinions. Most disability benefits are provided through insurance companies.
These companies will also adjudicate claims in the vast majority of cases.
Thus, a conflict of interest exists; post-Glenn, that is an important factor to be
taken into account.
Nord stands for the proposition that plan administrators must not unreasonably refuse to credit the treating physicians' opinions. Pre-Glenn authority
holds that courts must evaluate not only the quantity but the quality of medical evidence. After Glenn, it seems entirely reasonable to assume that courts
may take a more searching evaluation of benefit denials when a conflicted
plan administrator (as will often be the case), prefers the opinions of reviewing physicians over treating physicians.
VI. CONCLUSION

In short, it seems that the courts have de facto turned the treating physician rule into an "examining physician" factor--one used to determine if there
has been a first-hand evaluation of the state that has allegedly led to the impairment. However, the distinction on the grounds of objective/subjective
medicine in the two medical disciplines is unnecessary and untenable.

(quoting Standards for Consultative Examinations and Existing Medical Evidence, 56 Fed. Reg.
35934-35 (1991) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416)). Schneider goes on to say "[tjhe Social
Security regulations thereby reveal a basic tension in that they strive for objective identification
of disability while acknowledging that the decision-making procedure includes a certain amount
of subjectivity and individualization." Schneider, supra note 25, at 402. If this is true of the
medical decision-making process, it is not contingent upon whether such decisions are being
made in the Social Security rather than the ERISA context, and distinctions about objective/subjective diagnoses are not reasons for excepting psychiatric problems from Nords decision.

